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Abstract: 
This paper investigates optimal central bank disclosure in an economy in which only a proportion of 
firms adjusts prices each period to reflect current information. Such information comprises a firm-
specific signal of the current state of aggregate demand and, potentially (depending on the transparency 
regime) a public signal disseminated by the central bank. The economy has two sources of price 
dispersion: first, the heterogeneity of the private signals of firms whose prices always reflect current 
information, and second, the non-adjustment of prices by firms that fail to update their information from 
period-to-period. Monetary policy is conducted by the central bank to maximize expected welfare, with 
the study’s focus on the optimal degree of transparency. A key finding is that, for plausible values of 
model parameters, full transparency cannot be optimal: whether zero or partial transparency is desirable 
then depends on the proportion of firms failing to update their information each period. 
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1. Introduction 
A major issue in monetary policy design is that of whether central banks should publicly 
reveal the information on which their policy decisions are based. As widely documented (see 
for example, Blinder et al., 2008; Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014), modern central bank 
practice reflects, to a large degree, a belief that transparency is conducive to the attainment of 
the aims of policy. Nonetheless, theoretical support for the alleged efficacy of central bank 
disclosure is far from categorical.  
A particular qualification to the case for transparency is identified in the literature concerned 
with the consequences of imperfect heterogeneous information regarding economic 
fundamentals in economies in which strategic complementarities are present. This literature, 
initiated by Morris and Shin’s (2002) important contribution, has shown that in such an 
environment individual incentives to align actions with those of other agents may either 
undervalue or overstate the social benefits from coordination. The associated departure from 
efficiency which potentially arises in the context of dispersed information then gives rise to 
the possibility that improvements in private sector information will be detrimental to welfare. 
In such an instance, any public communication from the central bank regarding its assessment 
of the prospective economic state can then be counter-productive. 
Within the related literature, two critical factors have been identified as determining the 
welfare effects of central bank transparency. First, whether or not there is a divergence 
between what Angeletos and Pavan (2007a) define as ‘the equilibrium degree of 
coordination’ and ‘the socially optimal degree of coordination’. Such a divergence underpins 
the potential, referred to above, for inefficiency in private sector responses to available 
information. The second consideration is then whether the central bank uses its own 
information, which is not directly observed by the private sector but which potentially might 
be made public, to undertake active monetary policy intervention. Optimal stabilization 
policy is able to ensure that the dispersed information of the private sector and the central 
bank’s own information are together exploited efficiently: however, its ability to accomplish 
this depends crucially on the latter not being publicly disclosed.
1
 These principles are 
                                                 
1
 We note that central bank disclosure might be detrimental even in the absence of stabilization policy if the 
equilibrium degree of coordination exceeds the socially optimal degree of coordination: Morris and Shin’s 
(2002) ‘beauty contest’ model provides an example of such an eventuality, though as argued by Svensson 
(2006) their ‘anti-transparency’ conclusion depends crucially on parameter values. On the other hand, in the 
presence of policy intervention, if such policy is not directed at maximizing a measure of social welfare which is 
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established in James and Lawler (2011, 2012a) in the context of abstract representations of an 
economy, and are reflected in the findings of Baeriswyl and Cornand’s (2010) analysis of 
transparency using a micro-founded macroeconomic model. 
The present paper examines the robustness of these principles to the presence of some private 
sector agents who do not base their economic choices on continuously updated information. 
Specifically, applying the simple general equilibrium framework due to Woodford (2002, 
2003) and Adam (2007), in which firms’ pricing decisions are made in an uncertain 
macroeconomic environment, we assume only a subset of these firms to adjust their prices in 
response to contemporaneous signals regarding the current economic state. The remaining 
firms are then assumed to set prices at values which maximize the expected value of profits, 
conditional on information available in the previous period.  
Firms which update their information in the current period observe a firm-specific private 
signal of the realized value of an aggregate demand shock. They may also, depending on the 
transparency regime, observe a public signal communicated by the central bank, and derived 
from the latter’s own signal of the shock. For simplicity, the central bank is assumed to be the 
sole source of public information;
2
 the degree of transparency is then represented by the 
information content of the signal transmitted by the central bank. In addition to potentially 
being communicated (possibly in a modified form) to the private sector, the central bank’s 
own signal informs its setting of monetary policy. 
The adopted approach to modelling price-setting behaviour can be rationalized in terms of the 
costs of information acquisition and processing of the type that underpin Mankiw and Reis’s 
concept of ‘sticky information’, and which lead a fraction of firms not to update their 
information in any given period. The particular representation of this phenomenon followed 
in the present paper also characterizes the analyses of Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) and 
Hahn (2014). Both these contributions investigate the implications of informational 
heterogeneity for the welfare consequences of central bank transparency. However, the 
former paper ultimately focuses on the limiting case arising as the proportion of firms 
updating their information each period approaches unity. Consequently, it does not directly 
                                                                                                                                                        
consistent with the payoff functions of individual agents then it will generally be associated with the possibility 
that greater transparency is welfare-improving: see, for example, Walsh (2007).   
2
 The presence of further sources of public information would not affect the conclusions drawn from the analysis 
that follows, providing that the errors in any additional public signals contain components that are orthogonal to 
the errors in the central bank’s signal.  
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examine the issue that represents the principal concern of this paper. Hahn’s analysis, on the 
other hand, while considering a scenario in which a subset of firms does not update 
information each period, differs from the current investigation in assuming the central bank to 
set monetary policy in a discretionary manner, rather than according to a pre-defined rule. 
The potential for multiple equilibria in a discretionary policy environment then takes the 
focus of Hahn’s paper in a different direction (and to different conclusions) than that of the 
analysis that follows.    
Significantly, the presence of firms which do not update their information prior to setting 
prices gives rise to a source of heterogeneity in information additional to that associated with 
the idiosyncratic private signals observed by firms which do update. In this respect, the 
present analysis is connected to that contained in James and Lawler (2012b), which assumes 
differences in information quality across two groups of private sector agents in the setting of 
Morris and Shin’s (2002) framework.3 In the context of the current model, heterogeneity of 
information is reflected in dispersion of prices: such dispersion represents a source of welfare 
loss additional to that arising from aggregate output volatility. The latter, like price 
dispersion, is amplified by the presence of firms that do not set prices on the basis of current 
information. 
The study’s focus is on the following question: given that, conditional on the signal observed 
by the central bank, monetary policy is conducted optimally from the perspective of social 
welfare, how does the release of some or all of the central bank’s information to the private 
sector impact on welfare outcomes? If all firms adjusted prices in response to current signals, 
social welfare would, in accordance with the analyses of Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) and 
James and Lawler (2011, 2012a), be strictly declining in the degree of transparency. 
However, in the presence of firms whose prices do not incorporate current information, we 
find that there is no definitive answer to the question: indeed, it is possible for zero, full or 
some intermediate degree of transparency to be optimal. Nonetheless, reference to empirical 
evidence regarding the values of key parameters suggests that full transparency is likely to be 
dominated, in a welfare sense, by zero transparency. Whether or not the latter is to be 
preferred to partial transparency is shown to depend on the proportion of firms whose pricing 
decisions do not reflect current information.  
                                                 
3
 In James and Lawler (2012b), the private sector is assumed to comprise two sets of agents, of equal size,  
distinguished by the precision of the private signals that they observe; as in Cornand and Heinemann (2008), 
each agent observes a public signal, disclosed by the policymaker, with a fixed probability common to both sets 
of agents.   
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model structure. 
Our main results are identified and discussed in Section 3, which determines the properties of 
the model’s equilibrium and analyses the welfare effects of transparency. In Section 4, the 
implications of a corrective tax scheme, as originally considered by Angeletos and Pavan 
(2007b, 2009), are briefly explored. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and presents the 
conclusions to be drawn from the study.    
 
2. The model 
The model that provides the vehicle for the analysis of this paper derives from the micro-
founded general equilibrium framework developed in the studies of Woodford (2002, 2003) 
and Adam (2007), and applied in the context of the transparency issue by Baeriswyl and 
Cornand (2010), Hahn (2010), and Roca (2010).
4
 There is a continuum of monopolistically 
competitive price-setting firms, uniformly distributed over the unit interval with each 
employing a common production technology. The representative household’s utility is 
defined over consumption, described by a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over the varieties of 
differentiated goods, and leisure. The framework allows household welfare to be represented, 
as a second-order approximation, by the following:
5
  
   
1
2 2
0
[ ( ) ]iW p p di y   
                                                             
(1) 
where ip  is the price set by firm i , 
1
0
( )ip p di   identifies the average price across all firms, 
i.e. the price level, and y represents the output gap, i.e. the deviation of actual output from its 
‘natural’ or full information level.6 Realized welfare is therefore determined both by the 
degree of price dispersion across firms and by the magnitude of the output gap. Within the 
                                                 
4
 The framework is also applied in James and Lawler (2015) to examine the consequences of heterogeneous 
information for the optimal policy regime. 
5
 For a derivation of this approximation see, for example, Woodford (2002) and Adam (2007).  
6
 Because of the type of shock considered in this paper, i.e. to aggregate demand, the full information output 
level is constant. The latter’s value is, for convenience, normalized at zero and so the terms ‘output gap’ and 
‘output’ can be used interchangeably. Aggregate demand shocks provide an example of a broader class of 
shocks, including those to technology and to household preferences, that do not affect the relationship between 
full information equilibria and the corresponding socially optimal outcomes.  Shocks to mark-ups in the goods 
or labour markets do impact on this relationship and introduce additional considerations which tend to reinforce 
the broad tenor of the results identified in this paper. 
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model, heterogeneity of product prices is relevant to welfare because of its consequences for 
the dispersion of output levels across firms. In this context, changes in the price level impact 
on welfare only insofar as they affect the extent of price (and therefore output) dispersion.  
The relative importance of the two components of the right-hand-side of (1), is determined by 
the structural parameter  , whose value depends on the degree of risk aversion of the 
household as well as the elasticity of substitution, ( 1)  , between different varieties of good.  
Firm i’s optimal price, ˆ ip , is found from consideration of its profit-maximization problem to 
be a linear function of its expectations of the price level and the output gap: 
     ˆ ( )i ip E p y                                                                         (2) 
where the parameter  , which determines the responsiveness of ˆ ip  to the expected output 
gap, is related to   by  = , and thus   . 
Aggregate nominal demand, n, within the economy is determined by the setting of the central 
bank’s policy instrument, g, and the realization of an aggregate demand shock,  , i.e. n (≡ p 
+ y) = g + . In conducting the analysis, we assume realizations of the shock to be drawn, as 
in Morris and Shin (2002), from a uniform prior over the real line. Although this appears a 
somewhat special case and, as will be discussed, has certain implications for the optimal 
conduct of monetary policy, all the principal results of this paper, as reported in Sections 3 
and 4, can be shown to extend to the case of a normally distributed disturbance.
7
  
The above expression for nominal income can be rearranged as: 
   y g p            (3) 
allowing (2) to be expressed as: 
     ˆ [(1 ) ( )]i ip E p g            (2’) 
Equation (2’) makes clear the dependence of firm i’s optimal price on the prices set by all 
other firms. We consider the case of (0,1)  , in which case prices are strategic 
                                                 
7
 The case in which realizations of   are normally distributed is analyzed in an appendix, available from the 
authors on request. 
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complements, i.e. there is a benefit (declining in  ) to the individual firm of aligning its own 
price with those of other firms.  
The significance of a strategic complementarity in price setting derives from the presence in 
the model, discussed below, of dispersed private sector information. These aspects of the 
framework connect the current study to the literature initiated by Morris and Shin’s (2002) 
identification of the potential dangers of public disclosure of information by policymakers. 
Important in this context is Angeletos and Pavan’s (2007a) distinction between the 
equilibrium degree of coordination and the socially optimal degree of coordination. The 
former identifies the equilibrium response of agents’ actions to the expected aggregate value 
of such actions, while the latter indicates the socially efficient response. Should these 
coordination concepts diverge in value then, in the presence of information that is 
heterogeneous across agents, the private incentives to align actions do not appropriately 
reflect the social benefits of such alignment. 
Morris and Shin’s (2002) important contribution employs a model in which the equilibrium 
degree of coordination exceeds the socially optimal degree of coordination. The key 
implication of this is that public information is accorded an inefficiently high weight relative 
to private information and provides the source of the conclusion that greater precision of 
public information might be damaging to welfare. The present framework, in contrast, is 
characterized by an equilibrium degree of coordination which lies below the socially optimal 
degree of coordination.
8
 Reflecting this, the individual firm does not fully recognize the 
social benefit of aligning its own price with other firms’ prices, with the consequence that 
price setting entails an excessive weight being placed on idiosyncratic private information.  
If each firm’s individual product price was continuously adjusted to its (ex ante) optimal 
value, ˆ ip , conditional on current information, price (and output) dispersion would purely 
reflect the idiosyncratic information errors associated with heterogeneous firm-specific 
signals. However, we assume that a proportion (0,1)  of firms do not update their 
information each period: consequently, given the assumed stochastic properties of the shock, 
such firms leave prices unchanged at their previous period’s value.  
                                                 
8
 The equilibrium degree of coordination is 1  , while its socially optimal counterpart is 1  ,with the 
relationship between   and   implying 1 1    . Note that for   = 1 individual firms do not perceive 
any strategic complementarity, despite the social benefit of price alignment. 
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As indicated in the Introduction, this assumption can be rationalized by reference to the costs 
of acquiring and processing information. In the same way as in Mankiw and Reis (2002), 
such costs mean that only a proportion of firms base their pricing decisions on current 
information. We note that, in assuming that state variable realizations are uncorrelated, the 
present model abstracts from the dynamic implications of sticky information that are central 
to Mankiw and Reis’s contribution. This allows a clearer focus on the consequences of 
informational heterogeneity arising from the presence of non-updating firms.
9
 In the present 
context, the non-adjustment of prices by firms that fail to revise their information provides a 
source of price dispersion further to that arising from heterogeneity of the information 
possessed by firms which do update, while also impacting on volatility of the output gap. 
Firms are ordered such that those who fail to update their information prior to setting prices 
are distributed along the interval (0,  ), while those who employ current information to 
determine their optimal price lie in the interval [  ,1]. The common price of the goods 
produced by the former group is normalized for convenience, but without any loss of 
generality
10
, at zero. It follows that the price level is described by: 
   
1 1
ˆ
i ip p di p di
 
          (4) 
Using p  to denote the average price of firms which adjust prices in response to current 
information, i.e. 
1
1 1
1 1
ip p di p

 
 
 
, the measure of price dispersion relevant for 
welfare, as identified in (1), can be written as: 
                                                 
9
 In fact, the presence of autocorrelation would not, in itself, modify the main aspects of the analysis that 
follows in any significant way. Assume   to be determined according to 1t t t    , where 0 1  , and 
t  is now drawn from a uniform prior over . Then, if all firms learn of the actual value of   at the end of the 
period in which it occurs and incorporate this information into the subsequent period’s prices, while a fraction 
1   also use current information regarding the innovation  , the principal features and conclusions of our 
study would stand unaltered in all essential respects. In Mankiw and Reis (2002), only updating firms learn of 
the most recent innovation to the state variable, and it is this feature that generates the dynamic characteristics of 
their framework. 
10
 The normalization is completely inconsequential, but simplifies notation. Allowing for differences in the 
prices of non-updating firms would add a further source of price dispersion, distinct from those arising with a 
common price, but one that gives rise to a deadweight loss which cannot be influenced by policy. 
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1 1
2 2 2
0
( ) (1 ) ( )i ip p di p p p di

                      (5)
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The first term on the right-hand side of (5) captures the component of price dispersion 
attributable to the difference between the common price of non-updating firms and the mean 
price of the remainder of firms, each of which uses its observation of contemporaneous 
signals in setting its price. The second term then reflects the price dispersion within the latter 
group as a result of the heterogeneity of those signals. 
Individual prices set by updating firms are based on imperfect information regarding the 
realization of the aggregate demand shock. Specifically, firm i ( [ ,1])i   observes an 
idiosyncratic signal, i  (unobserved by any other firm), of  , where i i    , with
),0(~ 2 Ni  and   0jiE   for ij  , while 
1
0i di

  . In addition to this private signal, 
firm i also potentially has access to a public signal, whose source is the central bank. This 
public signal is then used in conjunction with the firm’s private signal to form optimal 
estimates (conditional on the observed signals) of  , p, and g , which are then combined, as 
described by (2), to determine ˆ ip . 
Prior to both making any announcement and implementing monetary policy, the central bank 
observes its own noisy signal,  , of  the aggregate demand shock, with  =    , where
2~ (0, )N    
and   0,iE i   . This signal is private to the central bank, in the sense that it 
cannot be observed directly by any firm. However, depending on the transparency regime, the 
central bank may choose to disclose its value, possibly in a modified form, to the private 
sector. Transparency is modelled in terms of how precisely the central bank reveals its own 
information to the private sector. The public signal,  , potentially introduces additional noise 
to the central bank’s own signal before being communicated to the public. In particular, the 
                                                 
11
 If the initial average price of updating firms is identical to that of the non-updating firms, then this expression 
can be written, as in Hahn (2014), as 
1 1
2 2 2
0
( ) ( )
1
i ip p di p p di




   
 
, where  ( 1p p  ) represents the 
inflation rate. Thus, price inflexibility (whatever its source) on the part of a sub-set of firms introduces a route 
through which inflation impacts on social welfare in contexts where complete price flexibility would imply 
inflation per se was welfare-neutral (see Woodford, 2003). Note that substitution of the above expression into 
(1) gives rise to a welfare function which, apart from the term associated with information heterogeneity across 
the updating firms, is identical to that employed in numerous studies where the social loss function is not 
derived explicitly from an underlying micro-founded model.    
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central bank is assumed to commit to a disclosure rule of the form:      where 
2~ (0, )N   ,   0,iE i    and   0E   . This characterization of disclosure policy is 
that followed in James and Lawler (2011) and used extensively in the monetary policy 
transparency literature,
12
 allowing the extreme cases of zero ( 2  ) and full (
2 0  ) 
disclosure to be captured, as well as intermediate degrees of central bank transparency.  
Firm i’s ( [ ,1]i  ) observation of the public signal is used together with its private signal13 
to form an expectation of  ,
[ ,1]
( )i
i
E



2 2 2 2 2 2[( ) ]/( )i                 . Similarly, 
combining i  and   allows an updating firm to improve its estimate of the signal observed 
by the central bank,  , compared to that arrived at using the public signal alone, with the 
optimal estimate of   described by
[ ,1]
( )i
i
E



2 2 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ]/( )i                 . The 
precision of   as a signal of  (as measured by 2
 ) plays a crucial role in determining the 
strength of private sector pricing responses to central bank announcements and thereby in 
influencing the impact of monetary policy.   
The objective of monetary policy is to maximize expected welfare. The central bank is 
assumed to adjust its instrument according to a pre-determined rule; in the context of the 
present model, the optimal rule defines the setting of the instrument as a linear function of the 
central bank’s current information, which consists of both the actual realization of its own  
signal,  , and the publicly announced value of the latter,  .
14
 Hence, the setting of the 
monetary policy instrument is determined according to: 
                                                 
12
 Notable examples include Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002). An 
alternative representation of transparency is in terms of Cornand and Heinemann’s (2008) concept of the ‘degree 
of publicity’ which identifies the extent of transparency with the proportion of private sector agents to whom the 
central bank’s signal is disclosed. Cornand and Heinemann’s approach is applied in Walsh (2007) and in James 
and Lawler (2012a, 2012b). 
13
 It is assumed that no firm observes the value of the central bank’s policy instrument before setting its price. 
Thus we abstract from the potential signaling role, emphasized in Baeriswyl and Cornand’s (2010) study, that 
policy might play. The analysis of James and Lawler (2012a) suggests that allowing for such a signaling role 
does not change the conclusions regarding optimal transparency compared to when such a role is absent.   
14
 The central bank is assumed not to observe any ip  ( [ ,1]i  ) prior to choosing its setting of policy; while it 
has knowledge of the common price of non-updating firms’ output our normalization means that its value does 
not appear explicitly in the policy rule as described by (6). We further note that if all firms used current 
information in setting prices, a policy response to   would be irrelevant, since the pricing responses of firms to 
the public signal would render welfare outcomes independent of this component of policy. Hence the optimal 
value of 2  would be indeterminate. However, with the prices of a subset of firms failing to incorporate current 
information, policy responses to the public signal invariably have an impact on welfare outcomes.  
10 
 
   1 2
g     
       
(6) 
The values of the rule parameters, i.e. 1  and 2  are chosen, simultaneously with 
2
 , to 
maximize expected welfare, with these values assumed to be public knowledge. These 
regime-design decisions therefore represent the first stage in the model’s assumed sequence 
of events, summarized by the following timeline: 
 
3. Equilibrium and the Welfare Effects of Transparency 
3.1 Equilibrium and optimal policy 
We begin by identifying the equilibrium pricing decisions of those firms which set prices 
using current information, taking as given both the values of the rule parameters and the 
‘degree of transparency’, as captured by 2 . The model structure implies that the optimal 
price of an updating firm can be expressed as a linear function of the two signals that it 
observes, i.e.: 
   1 2
[ ,1]
i i
i
p

  

           (7) 
From the property 
1
0i di

  , it follows that the average price set by updating firms, p , is 
given by 1 2p      , implying 1 2(1 )( )p        . Using the latter, together with the 
output 
determined 
each updating firm observes 
both noisy public signal  of 
 and a private noisy signal of 
 
policy instrument 
and prices set 
simultaneously 
AD shock  
realized 
cb observes , its 
own noisy signal of 
  
design of 
policy regime: 
, ,  chosen 
by cb  
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policy rule (6), to substitute for p and g respectively in (2′), firm i’s ( [ ,1])i   expectations 
of   and  , as previously identified, can then be used in conjunction with (2′) to express the 
firm’s optimal price as a function of i  and  . With
[ ,1]
ˆ
i i
i
p p

 , equating the coefficients on 
the signals in this expression with their counterparts in equation (7) allows the equilibrium 
values of 1  and 2  to be determined: 
2 2
1
1 2 2 2
[ (1 ) ]
[ ( )]
 
  
   

  
 

 
   (8a)
 
2 2 2
1
2 22 2 2
( )
( )
  
  
   
 
  
   
  
     
             (8b)
 
where (1 )      . 
It follows that each updating firm sets its individual product price according to:  
  
2 2 22 2
11
22 2 2 2 2 2
[ ,1]
( )[ (1 ) ] 1
[ ( )] ( )
i i
i
p
   
      
     
   
     
      
    
            
(9) 
The corresponding expression for p then follows from 
1
ip p di

  , and that for p  from the 
fact that 
1
1
p p



.  
Realized welfare can now be found using (7) and the implied expressions for p  and p , in 
combination with equations (3) and (6), to substitute for the price dispersion and output gap 
terms in (1):   
W = 
2
2 2
1 2 2 1(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) 

          
 
          
    
                
2
1 2 1 2 2 2 2(1 ) [ (1 ) ] [ (1 ) ]

            
 
         
 
          (10)
15
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 Implicit in (10) are the equilibrium values of 1  and 2  as described by (8a) and (8b): the representation of 
(10) also makes use of the fact that these equilibrium values are related by: 1 2 1 2(1 ) /         . 
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In general, the distribution of welfare outcomes will reflect the stochastic properties of   and 
the signal error terms. From the assumed distribution of the state variable, it is evident that 
for arbitrary combinations of 1  and 2  the unconditional expectation of welfare will be 
undefined. However, if the policy rule parameters are restricted to sum to 1, in which case 
the central bank fully offsets its expectation of the aggregate demand shock, the direct 
influence of the shock on welfare is eliminated, as is evident from (10). Unconditional 
expected welfare is then obtained by integrating over the normally distributed disturbances   
and  , and is clearly well defined.16  
Imposing the constraint 1 2 1     on the policy rule and applying it to (10), allows the 
unconditional value of expected welfare to be taken and the optimal values of the two policy 
parameters to be found from the relevant first order conditions. Denoting these values by 
1
  
and 
2
 , we find: 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
[ ( )][ ( )]
( )( ) [2 ( ) ]
     
       
      

         

   
 
        
           (11a) 
                 
2 2 2 2
2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
(1 ) {( 2) [ ( 1) ]( )}
( )( ) [2 ( ) ]
   
       
        

         

     

        
            (11b) 
where (1 )      . 
The identified values of 
1
  and 
2
  allow us to determine equilibrium expected welfare with 
policy set optimally, which we denote by *( )E W : 
2 2 2 2 2 22
*
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
[ ( )][ ( )]
( )
( )( ) [2 ( ) ]
E W
     
       
      
          
    
  
         
              (12) 
The above expression provides the basis for the analysis of how central bank transparency, as 
measured by the quality of the public signal provided by the central bank, i.e. 2 , impacts on 
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 If realizations of the shock were assumed to be normally distributed then policy would be formulated to only 
partially offset the central bank’s expectation of  . Modelling   to follow a normal distribution captures the 
present analysis as the limiting case associated with 
2
  . 
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welfare. We begin by comparing the welfare implications of the limiting cases of zero 
2( )   and full 
2( 0)   disclosure. Besides being prominent cases in the literature in 
their own right, these extreme instances of transparency also provide the appropriate 
benchmarks when identifying the globally optimal degree of transparency. 
 
3.2 Limiting cases of transparency and expected welfare  
3.2.1 The welfare implications of zero transparency 
Under a regime of zero transparency, the public signal conveys no useful information to the 
private sector regarding the central bank’s observation of  : reflecting this, optimal policy is 
described in terms of a monetary policy response solely to the central bank’s own signal, with 
1 1
    and 2 0
  . To determine the value of expected welfare under zero disclosure, 
which we denote by ( )ZDE W
 , the limit of (12) as 2   is taken:  
   
2
2( ) ( )ZDE W





    
                         
(13) 
In interpreting this expression, we first note from (9) that (with 
1 1   , 2 0  ) as 
2
   
[ ,1]
0i
i
p

 , i.e. updating firms do not adjust their prices in light of the observed values of their 
private signals. This is because, in the absence of any informative public announcement, firm 
i’s best estimate of any other updating firm’s price is its own price, ip , implying from (2’) 
and the relationship between p  and p  that
[ ,1] [ ,1]
( )i i
i i
p E g
 
 
 
   . Moreover, with the 
setting of monetary policy directed at fully neutralizing the central bank’s own expectation of 
 ,
[ ,1]
i
i
E

(  g) = 0.17 Consequently, the prices of updating firms are, under zero 
transparency, unresponsive to observations of private signals and therefore remain perfectly 
aligned, both relative to each other and with respect to non-updating firms’ prices. Thus, 
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 This follows from the property ( | ) ( | )i i i i iE E      . 
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there is no price dispersion and the loss in welfare identified by (13) arises purely from 
aggregate output fluctuations associated with central bank expectational errors.
18
 
3.2.2 Expected welfare with full transparency 
In this case, the central bank fully discloses the observed value of its own signal to the public, 
i.e.
 
  , though by assumption only a proportion 1   of firms use the announcement to 
update the information set on which their pricing decisions are based. Denoting expected 
welfare in the case of full disclosure, and with policy set optimally,
19
 by ( )FDE W
 , we find, 
taking the limit of (12) as 2 0  : 
 
2 2 2 22
2 2 2
( )( )
( )
( )
FDE W
   
 
   
  

  
  
                            
(14) 
As for the case of zero transparency, central bank expectational errors, which lead to 
imperfect stabilization of the impact of the aggregate demand shock, are the proximate source 
of the welfare loss represented by (14). However, in the present case, additional forces come 
into play.  
By combining the information content of their private signals with that conveyed by the 
public signal, updating firms are able to form a superior estimate of   compared to that based 
on the public signal alone. Hence, in this case, each firm adjusts its price in response to its 
own expectation of the central bank’s policy error. This exploitation of the information 
present in private signals has a beneficial welfare consequence, since it leads to a reduction in 
aggregate output volatility relative to the zero disclosure case.
20
 At the same time, however, 
price dispersion is introduced, both within the set of updating firms and between this group 
and the set of non-updating firms: of course, such dispersion is detrimental to welfare. 
                                                 
18
 As noted previously, in the case of a normally distributed aggregate demand shock policy is designed to only 
partially offset expected shock realizations. As a consequence, updating firms are induced to respond to their 
private signals of   by adjusting prices. In this instance, the equilibrium under zero transparency is therefore 
characterised by a degree of price dispersion. 
19
 Note that, although taking the limit of (11a) and (11b) as 2 0   
identifies unique values of the two policy 
parameters, with   identical to   the individual values of 1  and 2  
are immaterial, so long as they are 
constrained to sum to unity. In this instance, as for the case of zero transparency (though for a different reason), 
optimal policy can be represented in terms of a single response coefficient relating to the adjustment of the 
instrument g to the central bank’s own signal, . 
20
 The variance of aggregate output under full disclosure is given by 
2( )FDE y =
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) /( )          . It is 
straightforward to show that this is smaller in value than the corresponding variance under zero disclosure, 
2
 . 
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3.2.3 Comparing welfare outcomes in the extreme cases of transparency 
To evaluate the relative welfare performances of the limiting cases of disclosure, we subtract 
equation (14) from (13). Following some straightforward, though tedious, algebraic 
manipulation, we arrive at: 
 
3 6 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
(1 ) ( ) ( 2) (1 )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ZD FDE W E W
  
   
       
      

 

    
   
    
                 (15) 
This expression cannot be signed on a priori grounds and, thus, which of the two extreme 
instances of transparency delivers a superior welfare outcome is, in general, indeterminate. 
However, noting that 2 2(1 ) /( )    
   is strictly decreasing in   for [0,1] , it follows 
that a sufficient condition for zero disclosure to outperform full disclosure is 
2 2/ ( 2) /      . We now turn to consider whether this inequality is likely to be satisfied 
in practice. 
The left hand side of the inequality is simply the precision of the private signals observed by 
updating firms relative to the precision of the central bank’s signal. Some insight into the 
range of values within which this ratio is likely to lie is provided by Romer and Romer’s 
(2000) empirical study of the comparative accuracy of private-sector and Federal Reserve 
forecasts of U.S. inflation. They find that the latter are more accurate than the former, 
rationalizing this conclusion in terms of the considerable resources devoted by the Federal 
Reserve to forecasting. This argument, which seems likely to have validity beyond the U.S., 
is drawn on by Svensson (2006) in his critique of the interpretation of Morris and Shin’s 
(2002) findings as representing an ‘anti-transparency’ result. Indeed, he identifies a situation 
in which the precisions of private sector and central bank signals are equal as representing “a 
rather conservative benchmark case”.21 In developing our arguments, we adopt this reference 
point and take the maximum value of the relative precision of the two signals to be unity. 
Applying this benchmark to the sufficient condition identified above for zero disclosure to be 
associated with welfare outcomes superior to those arising under full disclosure, the 
inequality becomes 2   . As previously noted, the case in which goods are strategic 
complements corresponds to (0, 1)  : with the upper limit of this range imposed, a new 
                                                 
21
 Svensson (2006), p.449. 
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(stronger) sufficient condition for * *( ) ( )ZD FDE W E W  is identified, that is 3  . Consideration 
of whether the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods satisfies this inequality 
requires reference to empirical evidence. Ball and Romer (1990), in their study of real 
rigidities and monetary non-neutrality, refer to such evidence in applying a mark-up value of 
0.15 to their model, a figure which is broadly consistent with the values reported in Oliveira 
Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996), and the recent study by De Loecker and Warzynski 
(2012).
22
 Such a value implies an elasticity of substitution of 7.7, a magnitude which is 
comfortably in excess of that needed to ensure that zero disclosure is preferable to full 
disclosure. Indeed, observed mark-ups exceeding the implausibly large value of 0.5 would be 
necessary to imply a value of   less than 3. Thus, empirical evidence appears to be consistent 
with the notion that zero transparency gives rise to superior welfare outcomes compared to 
those resulting under full transparency. 
The conclusion that for plausible values of key parameters zero transparency is associated 
with higher welfare than full transparency might appear, at first sight, surprising. This is 
particularly so since, as previously discussed, within a regime of zero transparency the 
information content of each updating firm’s private signal is ‘lost’, in the sense that there is 
no price response to it and, consequently, attained welfare is identical to that which would 
arise if no firm updated its information set in the current period. The explanation for the 
finding lies in the feature which is at the centre of the related literature. That is, when both 
public and (heterogeneous) private signals are observed in an economy characterized by 
strategic complementarities, private sector actions based on that information are potentially 
inefficient from the viewpoint of social welfare. James and Lawler (2011, 2012a) using 
abstract models which incorporate strategic complementarities and heterogeneous 
information show that, in the presence of stabilization policy, any (otherwise private) 
information released by the policymaker is detrimental to welfare.
23
 Although this result is 
derived in the context of models which assume all private sector agents to base their 
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 Oliveira Martins et al’s (1996) paper covers 14 OECD countries over the period 1970-92, while De Loecker 
and Warzynski’s (2012) recent study employs Slovenian data relating to the years 1994-2000. 
23
 James and Lawler (2011) incorporates stabilization policy into the Morris and Shin (2002) framework and 
models the degree of transparency in an identical way to that followed in the present paper, i.e. the precision of 
the public signal disclosed by the central bank. In contrast, James and Lawler (2012a) represents disclosure 
policy as in Cornand and Heinemann (2008), with the central bank potentially revealing its own (unmodified) 
signal to only a subset of the private sector. Additionally, the payoff function applied in James and Lawler 
(2012a) is characterized by the property that, as in the present paper but in contrast to Morris and Shin (2002), 
private sector agents undervalue the social benefits arising from coordination of actions. 
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decisions on current information, it clearly has relevance (albeit in a modified form) to the 
current setting.  
To identify this inefficiency, we consider the pricing decisions of updating firms under full 
transparency. Each such firm’s price response to the signals that it observes reflects its 
estimate of the central bank’s expectational error,  , in respect of the aggregate demand 
shock.
24
 However, this response is muted somewhat by the coordination motive associated 
with the strategic complementarity which characterizes the model. Any price adjustment by 
updating firm i based on the signals that it observes will inevitably give rise to a deviation 
from the common price of non-updating firms’ output. Furthermore, with firm i’s estimate of 
  derived, in part, from its own private signal, the idiosyncratic element inherent in this 
signal represents a source of departure from the average price set by other updating firms. In 
the presence of a coordination motive, these factors lead to a reduced sensitivity of price 
adjustments to firms’ estimates of the central bank’s expectational errors regarding  . Firm 
i’s price under full disclosure of its signal by the central bank is given by:  
  
2
2 2
[ ,1]
( )i
i
i
p 
  
  
 



                 (16) 
which, for (0,1)  , is smaller in absolute magnitude than
[ ,1]
( )i
i
E



.
25
 
Notwithstanding the moderating effect which the coordination motive has on price 
adjustment, the incentives facing the individual firm to align its product price with those of 
other firms understate the true social benefit of coordination. Consequently, individual prices 
remain too responsive to the information content of observed signals.  The precise meaning 
of ‘too responsive’ in this context can be clarified by reference to the pricing decisions which 
                                                 
24
 From the relationship between 1 2,   and 1 2,   reported in footnote 15, it is evident that the constraint 
1 2 1     implies 1 2 0   . With 1 2
[ ,1]
i i
i
p

  

  , it follows that an updating firm’s price response to 
observed signals can, in general, be written as 1 1( ) ( )i i ip            . Substitution of the equilibrium 
value of 1  then provides an expression that describes the (disclosure regime-dependent) relationship between 
the price set by an updating firm and the latter’s estimate of the central bank’s expectational error. 
25
 It is evident from equation (2′) that for 1  ,  i.e. if there are no perceived strategic complementarities at the 
individual firm level, the price set by any updating firm is simply its expectation of the central bank’s error in 
estimating  : under full transparency
[ ,1]
( )i
i
E

 

  2 2 2( ) /( )i        . Of course, setting 1   in (16) yields 
this value for updating firm i’s price.   
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would maximize social welfare, i.e. the set of prices that would be chosen by a benevolent 
central planner whose objective was to maximize the expected value of (1), taking as given 
the existing dispersion of information. Denoting the socially optimal value of
[ ,1]
i
i
p

 by
[ ,1]
i
i
p

, 
determined according to 1 2
[ ,1]
i i
i
p

  

  , we identify the values of 1 and 2  which, with 
full disclosure and policy set optimally, maximize ( )E W . This exercise yields the following 
expression for the socially optimal price of each updating firm: 
      
2
2 2
[ ,1]
( )i
i
i
p 
  
  
 


 
                           (17) 
where (1 )       
With    it is evident, as previously indicated, that with full transparency the equilibrium 
prices of updating firms are overly-responsive, relative to the social-efficiency benchmark, to 
estimates of the central bank’s expectational error. Such overreaction underlies the finding 
that, in the presence of optimal policy intervention, zero transparency is, for plausible 
parameter values, superior to full transparency. Indeed, if it were possible to induce updating 
firms to adjust their prices in a socially optimal manner, full disclosure would lead to 
unambiguously better welfare outcomes than zero disclosure. Denoting expected welfare 
when the central bank fully reveals its estimate of  , while policy is adjusted optimally and 
updating firms set prices in accordance with (17) by *( )FDE W , we find:        
  
2 2 2
*
2 2
( )
( )FDE W
  
 
   
 

 
 
                           (18) 
Comparison of (18) with (13) directly reveals *( ) ( )FD ZDE W E W
 . If the central bank’s public 
signal and updating firms’ private signals are together exploited efficiently in setting prices, 
then welfare outcomes under full transparency will inevitably be superior to those associated 
with zero transparency, since in the latter case the information content of private signals is 
left unutilized.  
3.3 The optimal degree of transparency 
19 
 
Although, as discussed, plausible values for key parameters of the model imply that, with 
policy conducted optimally, zero transparency outperforms full transparency, this leaves open 
the question of whether some partial degree of transparency (i.e. with the public signal 
disclosed by the central bank providing imperfect information on its own signal’s value) 
might dominate both extreme cases of central bank disclosure. This possibility can be 
considered by examining the properties of the relationship between expected welfare and the 
quality of the public signal announced by the central bank. As might be expected from 
comparison of the two extreme cases of transparency, the nature of this relationship is 
dependent on parameter values. However, for 2 2    and 2  , the following two key 
properties of the relationship can be established: 
(i) 2
* 2
0
0 ( ) / |E W

 


   : i.e. beginning from a position of full transparency, a ‘small’ 
decline in the quality of the public signal is welfare improving. 
(ii) Defining ˆ /( 2)      , then for any   such that ˆ 1   , no value of 2 ℝ+ 
satisfies the first order condition * 2( ) / 0E W    , while for any   such that ˆ0     
there exists a unique value of 2 ℝ+ that satisfies 
* 2( ) / 0E W    . 
Reference to the empirical findings alluded to in considering the relative welfare implications 
of zero and full disclosure
26
 suggests that the parameter restrictions sufficient to ensure the 
above two properties hold are likely to be satisfied in practice. 
Turning now to the implications of these properties, the first establishes that full transparency 
cannot be optimal, since it ensures that there exists a range of strictly positive values of 2  
for which expected welfare exceeds that attained for 2 0  . The second property indicates 
that, depending on the actual value of   relative to the critical value, ˆ , either zero 
transparency or partial transparency can be optimal. In particular, if the proportion of non-
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Specifically, the evidence relating to both the relative accuracy of private sector and central bank forecasts, 
and the elasticity of substitution between goods.  
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updating firms is sufficiently large, in the sense that it exceeds ˆ , then zero transparency is 
optimal, while for values of   below ˆ  partial transparency is superior.27  
To interpret these conclusions, consider an increase in 2  beginning from a position of full 
transparency. A decline in the precision of the signal will have two direct effects. First, each 
updating firm’s estimate of the central bank’s expectational error will decline in absolute 
magnitude.
28
 Second, the responsiveness of an updating firm’s price to this expectation will 
be modified. Although this latter effect is indeterminate in direction, the combined impact of 
the two identified forces is an unambiguously diminished reaction of the price set by each 
updating firm to its observed signals.
29
 While increased aggregate output volatility results, the 
associated detrimental effect on welfare is initially outweighed by the beneficial 
consequences of lower price dispersion. If   lies in the interval ( ˆ ,1), then the favourable 
welfare effect of reduced public signal quality on price dispersion is dominant for all values 
of 2  and, hence, zero transparency is optimal. However, for ˆ(0, )  , as 
2
  increases 
from zero, a degree of signal precision will eventually be attained such that the marginal cost 
of greater output volatility associated with any further deterioration in the quality of the 
public signal exceeds the marginal benefit of less price dispersion. It follows that, in this case, 
an intermediate degree of transparency maximizes welfare. 
The potential for partial transparency to be optimal does not arise in the analyses contained in 
James and Lawler (2011, 2012a), in which all agents choose their actions based on currently 
available information, both private and public, and where the former, while dispersed, is 
homogeneous in quality. Rather, in both contributions, zero transparency unambiguously 
attains the welfare maximum in the presence of optimal policy. However, the possibility that 
an intermediate degree of transparency, in which the policymaker partially reveals its 
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 We note that there is a discontinuity in the relationship between *( )E W  and 2   as 0  . This 
discontinuity implies * *
0
0
lim ( ) ( ) |ZD ZDE W E W 



  and, for this reason, the current framework does not encompass 
the unambiguous (i.e. regardless of parameter values) superiority of zero disclosure when all firms base their 
pricing decisions on current information. The discontinuity arises from the combination of the assumed 
distribution of   and the presence of non-updating firms, and is not present if   is taken to be normally 
distributed.  
28
 For any arbitrary degree of transparency, an updating firm’s expectation of the central bank’s forecast error is 
described by 
2 2 2 2
[ ,1]
( ) ( ) /( )i i
i
E    

       

     , which, in absolute terms, is clearly diminishing in 2 . 
29
 With 1 ( )i ip     , the responsiveness of ip  to firm i’s observed signals is captured by the equilibrium 
value, when policy is set optimally, of 1 ; this coefficient is invariably positive in value, while its derivative 
with respect to 2  is unambiguously negative.  
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information, might be desirable is present in James and Lawler (2012b). The key feature of 
the framework developed therein is that the quality of private sector agents’ private 
information, as represented by the precision of the idiosyncratic signals they observe, is 
heterogeneous. Heterogeneity of quality of information is clearly also present in the current 
model, though extended to public as well as private information, with the precision of non-
updating firms signals being, in effect, zero. Thus, it appears that differences in information 
precision across agents represent a factor associated with the potential for partial transparency 
to be optimal.
30
  
A further aspect of the implications of heterogeneous information quality observed in James 
and Lawler (2012b) shared by the present analysis is that optimal stabilization policy, in 
combination with the optimal transparency regime, is unable to attain the ‘first best’: i.e. the 
welfare outcome associated with all agents reacting in a collectively efficient fashion to 
current information. This contrasts with the findings presented in James and Lawler (2011, 
2012a), but reflects the fact that, when information quality is non-homogeneous across 
agents, the policy rule cannot be tailored to induce all agents to choose their actions in a 
manner consistent with overall efficiency. This shortcoming of stabilization policy leads to 
the question of whether an alternative, or additional, form of policy intervention might be 
capable of improving welfare outcomes and we turn to consider this issue in the next section. 
 
4. An Optimally-Designed Pigouvian Tax  
A means of addressing the inefficiencies arising from dispersed information in economies in 
which strategic complementarities are present is identified by Angeletos and Pavan (2007b, 
2009). They show that an appropriately-designed tax regime can be used to manipulate the 
incentives which agents have to respond to information in such a way that, subject to the 
degree of information dispersion that characterizes the economy, the first best (i.e. socially 
efficient) outcome is attained. In this respect, such a tax represents an alternative to the direct 
                                                 
30The representation of central bank disclosure policy in terms of the central bank’s choice of the precision of 
the public signal as adopted in the analysis of this paper is important for the finding that, for plausible parameter 
values, partial transparency might dominate zero transparency. Assuming, instead, that the central bank 
potentially communicates its own (unmodified) signal only to a proper subset of firms, as in Cornand and 
Heinemann (2008) and James and Lawler (2012a, b), the conditions 3 < θ and 2  ≤ 
2
  are jointly sufficient to 
ensure zero disclosure is globally optimal.  
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policy intervention demonstrated to be capable of achieving the social optimum in James and 
Lawler (2011, 2012a).  
The optimal Pigouvian tax, which entails a marginal tax rate that depends on the value of 
aggregate actions, is derived by Angeletos and Pavan (2007b, 2009) in a setting within which 
all agents observe, and respond to, current information and where such information is of 
homogeneous quality across all agents. However, in their analysis of the implications of 
heterogeneous information quality in the context of the Morris and Shin (2002) framework, 
James and Lawler (2012b) show that Angeletos and Pavan’s conclusions extend to a setting 
in which the quality of private information potentially differs between agents. As such, the 
optimal tax regime, in correcting the inefficient use of information, ensures that full 
transparency maximizes social welfare while obviating the need for stabilization policy.  
Here we briefly consider the efficacy of a Pigouvian tax in the present model, in which the 
prices set by a proportion of firms do not incorporate current information at all. The tax 
(subsidy) imposed on each updating firm is a linear function of the deviation of its own price 
from the average price set by other updating firms, with the marginal tax rate assumed to be 
determined by this average price and the realization of the public signal. Each updating firm’s 
net tax liability,
31
 it  is described by 2( )( )i p it p p p     , implying its optimal price is: 
 
[ ,1]
1 ( )
1
p
i i
i
p E p g 


    

  
       
  
               (19) 
Applying the solution procedure of Section 3, we derive an expression for expected welfare 
for given values of the policy coefficients, 1,  2 ,  p  and  , then determine the optimal 
values of these parameters. These are: 
2 2 2
*
1 2 2 2
( )  
  
   

  
  
      
                 (20a)                     
2
*
2 2 2 2
(1 ) 
  
  

  
 
      
     (20b)
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2 2 2
*
2 2
( )( )
p
  
 
    

  
  
    
        (20c)           * 0              (20d) 
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 Each firm also receives a lump-sum transfer equal to the average tax liability across all firms.  
32
 As in the absence of the Pigouvian tax, optimal policy design must ensure that expected equilibrium welfare is 
bounded below. Given the specified tax, this requires not only that the stabilization policy coefficients sum to 
−1, but also that the tax parameter   be set at zero.  
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Substituting these values into the expected welfare expression that they collectively 
minimize, we find: 
 * * * *
1 1 2 2
2 2 2
2
2 2 2, , ,
( )
( )
p p
E W
 
  
       
  
   
 
     
  
       
              (21) 
 
It is straightforward to demonstrate that expected welfare is strictly decreasing in 2 , and 
thus the optimal value of 2  is zero, i.e. implementation of the optimal tax regime ensures 
that full transparency maximizes welfare. Moreover, by setting 2 0   in (21), it is directly 
evident from comparison with (18) that the optimal Pigouvian tax eliminates the inefficiency 
in pricing decisions identified in Section 3.2.3 completely.
33
 This conclusion is consistent 
with the findings of Angeletos and Pavan (2007b, 2009) and James and Lawler (2012b), 
which show an appropriately-designed tax regime to be capable of modifying the incentives 
facing agents in such a way as to induce socially-efficient responses to available information. 
However, in the current instance, direct monetary policy intervention is also an integral 
element in attaining a welfare maximum. In the presence of firms which do not base pricing 
decisions on current information, correcting the inefficiencies which would otherwise 
characterize the prices set by updating firms is not, in itself, sufficient to attain the social 
optimum. In this context, macroeconomic policy intervention is an essential complement to 
micro-based Pigouvian taxes.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Previous work that has considered the desirability, or otherwise, of central bank transparency 
has typically examined the issue using models in which all agents are assumed to respond to 
current information. Motivated by recognition that the costs of acquiring and processing 
information may deter firms from continuously updating the information on which their 
pricing decisions are made, as exemplified by Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) concept of ‘sticky 
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 In the presence of the Pigouvian tax (with   set to zero), under full transparency updating firm i’s pricing 
decision is described by 2 2 2
[ ,1]
( ) /[ ( ) ]i i p
i
p   

     

    . The optimal value of p  ensures that this 
coincides with the efficient response to the individual firm’s estimate of the central bank’s expectational error. 
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information’, the aim of the present study has been to identify how this phenomenon might 
influence the welfare consequences of transparency. 
The macroeconomic framework used to analyse this issue has the pricing decisions of 
individual firms at its centre. Within the model, even if all firms set prices on the basis of 
current information regarding aggregate demand shocks, as embodied in observations of both 
public and private signals, macroeconomic equilibrium would not correspond to the socially 
efficient outcome. This feature reflects the interaction between the strategic complementarity 
which characterizes the framework and heterogeneity of private information. The nature of 
the strategic complementarity is such that the incentives facing an individual firm do not 
adequately reflect the social benefits of price alignment. As a consequence, firms place too 
much weight on their private signals, giving rise to excessive price dispersion. The presence 
of firms whose prices do not incorporate current information on aggregate demand shock 
realizations then leads both to increased price dispersion and to greater output volatility. 
Although monetary policy intervention is able to mitigate the associated welfare losses, 
stabilization is inevitably imperfect. Thus, the question is raised of whether public disclosure 
of the central bank’s private information can bring the economy closer to the social optimum. 
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that, within the framework, there is no unequivocal 
answer to this question. If all prices responded to current information then, given optimally-
designed policy intervention, a regime of zero transparency would invariably maximize 
welfare, reflecting the principles exemplified in James and Lawler (2011, 2012a). However, 
the presence of non-updating firms introduces the possibility that either full transparency or 
some degree of partial transparency might be optimal. In this regard, as noted in Section 3, 
the conclusions echo those arrived at in James and Lawler (2012b), which shares the feature 
of the current model that the quality of information differs across groups of agents.  
Nonetheless, for empirically plausible parameter values, full transparency is welfare-
dominated by zero transparency. With stabilization policy conducted optimally, a regime of 
zero transparency eliminates price dispersion completely. Although this comes at the expense 
of greater aggregate output volatility compared to the case of full transparency, providing 
reasonable parameter restrictions hold then the welfare costs associated with this feature will 
be outweighed by the benefits arising from the absence of price dispersion. However, zero 
transparency implies that the information content of updating firms’ private signals is left 
completely unexploited. Reflecting this, partial disclosure of the central bank’s signal, which 
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induces updating firms to utilize their private information in order to improve their estimates 
of the central bank’s forecasting error, can potentially (that is, providing the proportion of 
updating firms is sufficiently large) improve welfare compared to zero transparency.   
The factor ultimately responsible for the likely inferiority of full transparency is the 
divergence within the model between the socially optimal and the equilibrium degrees of 
coordination. As discussed, this divergence is reflected in private incentives to align prices 
that understate the social benefits of such alignment. A Pigouvian tax, as originally 
considered by Angeletos and Pavan (2007b, 2009), provides a potential means of modifying 
the incentives facing firms in a manner that promotes the efficient use of information. Under 
the optimal tax scheme a regime of full transparency can, indeed, ensure that equilibrium 
outcomes coincide with socially efficient outcomes. However, unlike in Angeletos and Pavan 
(2007b, 2009) and James and Lawler (2012b), appropriately-formulated stabilization policy is 
also an essential component in attaining optimal outcomes. 
Notwithstanding the transparency implications of Pigouvian taxes, the findings that emerge 
from our analysis clearly cannot be viewed as providing endorsement of any general case for 
central bank disclosure. On the contrary, in the absence of corrective taxes, reference to 
empirical evidence on key model parameters suggests that, despite the theoretical ambiguities 
present, there should be a presumption against central banks fully revealing their information 
publicly. This conclusion reflects the principle, identified in James and Lawler (2011, 2012a), 
that when private sector agents respond to information in a collectively suboptimal manner, 
policymakers should not disclose their private information but, instead, use it to guide their 
conduct of stabilization policy. Although the presence of agents who do not respond at all to 
current information dilutes this principle to a degree, it nonetheless retains its core validity. 
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